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Abstract 
This paper summarises qualitative research undertaken within the “In-Service” stage of the lifecycle of Royal Navy surface ships and 
submarines. Whilst In-Service, Royal Navy vessels will typically cycle through three phases, i.e. Tasking, Upkeep and Regeneration. A series 
of semi-structured recorded interviews conducted with key stakeholders in each phase identifies and highlights common issues encountered 
whilst In-Service. Having identified common issues, e.g. risk, obsolescence, manpower availability, etc. additional interviews were undertaken 
to triangulate the results with other safety critical companies operating and maintaining complex systems, i.e. a power company operating an 
advanced gas-cooled nuclear reactor, rail infrastructure and Europe’s largest regional airline. 
 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of the Programme Chair of the Fourth International Conference on Through-life Engineering Services. 
 Keywords: Naval; Maintenance; Systems Engineering 
1. Introduction 
This paper reports the outcome of semi-structured recorded 
interviews with key stakeholders with a view to learning how 
the stakeholders use information systems to judge the material 
state of vessels. 
The Royal Navy (RN) operates and maintains a fleet of 
nuclear submarines, surface ships and auxiliary vessels; each 
may be considered to be an integrated complex system of 
systems [1]. The vessels vary in size and complexity from 
Vanguard class strategic ballistic missile nuclear submarines 
providing the United Kingdom’s (UK) “Continuous At Sea 
Deterrent” (CASD) to HMS Gleaner - providing advanced 
surveying capabilities.  
Regardless of size and role, “is the ship a safe environment 
to live on and work on” is a key objective in RN operations 
[2]. Furthermore, each vessel must be operating safely and 
safe to operate [3], even when in highly dynamic and 
potentially threatening environments ranging from the 
provision of humanitarian and medical relief in Sierra Leone [4] 
to being subject to possible hostile threats, such as probed by 
UAVs [5] or surface vessels [6] or an unknown submarine [7]. 
Unfortunately, naval vessels are “unreliable in the sense 
that they deteriorate with age and / or usage and ultimately 
fail” [8], consequently vessels require constant preventive and 
corrective maintenance. 
Vessels are designed for a specific Concept of Operations 
(CONOPS), e.g. anti-submarine, air-defence, mine counter 
measures. Changes in maritime doctrine, technology, tactical 
and strategic threat may render the original CONOPS invalid; 
necessitating a review of the CONOPS and a change in modus 
operandi and / or systems. 
Interviews were also conducted with other safety critical 
companies operating and maintaining complex systems to 
determine similarities and differences. Companies were 
selected on the basis of operation / maintenance of similar 
technology, longevity and complexity of the artefact. 
2. Ministry of Defence Lifecycle 
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) utilise the Acquisitions 
Operating Framework [9] known as CADMID. The acronym 
refers to six discrete stages, i.e. Concept, Assessment, 
Demonstration, Manufacture, In-Service and Disposal. The 
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framework is similar to ISO-15288, i.e. Systems Engineering 
- System Life Cycle Processes [10].  
Within the naval domain, In-Service constitutes the longest 
stage and is where the largest costs are incurred, in some 
cases up to 70% of the total cost of ownership of a vessel is 
expended at this stage [11]. Whilst In-Service a vessel will 
typically cycle through 3 phases, (i) Tasking –operational 
tasking in support of UK maritime doctrine (ii) Upkeep – 
maintenance and upgrade of “hard” systems which may 
include a docking (iii) Regeneration – testing and reactivation 
of “hard” and “soft” systems. 
3. Research Method 
Semi-structured recorded interviews were undertaken with 
key stakeholders in each cyclical phase with a view to 
learning how the stakeholders create / use information to 
assess the material state of vessels. Additional “triangulation” 
interviews were conducted with stakeholders from other 
safety critical organisations to assess the potential uniqueness 
of the naval domain. A nuclear power station was selected 
given the similarity in the engineering domain. A regional 
airline was selected to assess similarities in operating first 
level critical systems. A rail infrastructure company was 
selected given the longevity of the artefact and the high level 
of availability required in a safety critical environment. 
The construct for the interviews was based upon IDEF0; 
the “function” being, “the assessment of the material state” as 
a result of Inputs, Controls, Mechanisms and Outputs. This 
paper provides an overview of a number of the issues that 
influence the process of assessing the material state. Each 
recorded interview was subsequently transcribed verbatim and 
systematically analysed to determine commonality with 
respect to issues. 
4. Key Issues Identified 
Analysis of the recorded interviews identified a broad 
range of issues that encompass Controls and Mechanisms 
associated with material state assessment; these include Risk, 
Materiel, Suitably Qualified and Experienced Personnel, 
Vibration Monitoring, Configuration Management. However, 
this paper will only examine the first three. 
4.1. Risk 
Risk was often explicitly and implicitly identified by 
interviewees as an issue. ISO 31000 [12] provides a 
nonspecific definition of risk that reflects the highly diverse 
role of RN vessels, i.e., the “effect of uncertainty on 
objectives”. The taxonomy of risk often refers to the 
consequence of failure, however, the ISO definition allows for 
both positive and / or negative uncertainty and does not define 
the consequence but rather an objective which reflects the 
naval domain. A naval vessel may be required to fulfil 
multiple and diverse “objectives”, in a single operational 
deployment with varying levels of uncertainty and hence risk. 
The risk to a vessel and the operational objective is 
managed by means of duty holders. The RN utilise a 
triumvirate of duty holders to discharge a duty of care and 
manage risk, i.e. Commanding Officer Duty Holder (CODH), 
Operating Duty Holder (ODH) and Platform Duty Holder 
(PDH). The role and responsibility of the duty holders was 
referred to by many of the stakeholders, for example: 
“As the platform duty holder all you want to know that 
you’ve repaired my rudder stop, so the rudder stop is 
completely repaired” [13] 
Within the Tasking / Regeneration phase the greatest risk 
was perceived to be a failure to provide / maintain 
Operational Capability (OC) which is defined as the 
measurement of the ability of a platform to perform 
operational tasks. 
“CO Comment: This defect is a risk to my sustainability 
and requires swift support to rectify to avoid a potentially 
significant impact to contingent operations” [14] 
The raison d'être of a naval vessel is the delivery of OC in 
support of UK Maritime Doctrine, i.e., “The ability to project 
power at sea and from the sea to influence the behaviour of 
people or the course of events” [15]. The role of naval 
engineers is to provide and sustain OC by the application of 
maintenance, repair of equipments and the restoration of 
systems following damage [16]. Acceptable risk in a defence / 
naval environment is highly dynamic and defined by the 
overall command aim, which subsequently bounds the level of 
risk considered acceptable, i.e. 
“if you’re just doing a transit or a visit, … then you would 
accept far lower risks, if you’re doing a mission of some 
importance then criteria have moved” [17] 
The variation of risk is exemplified by a safety override 
fitted on nuclear powered submarines. Since the loss of the 
USS Thresher, a “battle-short” mechanism has been provided 
in submarines to override the automatic reactor shutdown if 
an operational emergency demands that reactor power be 
maintained [18, 19]. Conversely, civilian air and rail 
operations are extremely risk averse, 
“that’s the biggest thing that aviation doesn’t like, risk. We 
spend a huge amount of time avoiding risk” [20] 
“We are very risk averse as an industry… we are 
constantly trying to operate within the constraints of what 
we know is the least risky thing to do” [21] 
Naval engineers frequently apply their engineering 
judgement, i.e. “situations for which there is no formal 
guidance or policy and will be called upon to use engineering 
judgement to risk manage events” [16]. A common issue 
necessitating the application of engineering judgement is 
compounded risk, i.e., risk on top of risk, 
“that’s where engineering judgement comes into it; it’s 
almost like having a feel for how many small defects are 
going to add up to a big defect” [3] 
The comment detailed above was made on a surface ship, 
however, the issues are equally valid within the submarine 
domain. 
“As defects emerge, as issues occur we’ll review them and 
then we’ll have to make a judgement whether that will 
affect our ability to sail or operate correctly” [17] 
Delivering and sustaining OC may not necessitate the 
availability of weapons or sensors, but potentially more 
benign systems, e.g. davit’s or winches. 
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“AAV’s [Alongside Assurance Visit] thwarted in afternoon 
due to faulty boat davits.” [22] 
Given the physical constraints and operational environment 
of RN vessels, maintenance operations pose potential risks to 
maintainers [23, 24]. 
“HMS Endurance suffered a major flood in her Engine 
Room, resulting in the near loss of the ship. At the time of 
the incident ship’s staff were cleaning a high level sea 
water inlet strainer… hull valves opened unexpectedly, 
allowing water into the ship… the panel believes the 
potential for complacency to establish itself was high” [25] 
The majority of RN vessels are relatively “old” platforms, 
the average age being, Type 23 frigates 19 years, Trafalgar 
class submarines 25 years. The incidence of maintenance 
errors increases due to the increase in maintenance frequency 
as the equipment becomes older [26]; this is also relevant 
within a naval domain given the turnover of maintainers. 
“we came back with a defect … our hydraulic systems, all 
three different separate systems by the end of it had been 
cross connected and re-linked, so like we had one system 
doing everything” [27] 
Maintaining OC was the absolute criterion in the scenario 
detailed above; however, risks may include time pressure, as 
well as defects in work planning and safety management [28]. 
A lack of experience in maintaining complex systems can 
produce unintended consequences. In the case of a submarine 
the environment may also be hermetically sealed, 
“The sewage pump broke, we got to empty the tanks 
regularly, so we worked out we could use HP [High 
Pressure] air to blow them. Except the guy got the line-up 
wrong and he blew the ---- in the boat rather than out” 
[27]. 
The requirement to remain “on patrol” and submerged and 
“empty the tanks” compounded the problem of a failed 
sewage pump. The management and consequence of 
compounded risk is managed by the Heads of Department in 
consultation with the Captain,  
“…the Heads of Department and they will discuss what 
they think the overall impact is on operational capability 
and safety and then they will present their 
recommendations for the Captain” [17] 
Haddon-Cave in his Nimrod Report [29] highlighted the 
consequence of cumulative risk. Similarities exist with respect 
to cumulative risk and the role of the CODH in managing a 
complex system of systems constrained by multiple and 
potentially conflicting Operational Defects (OpDef) whilst 
endeavouring to maintain OC. 
“there’s no easy system to combine the individual 
deficiencies, have you got the required number of pumps or 
not is easy; but then, when you’ve got that and also 
something else and something else and that system, what is 
the overall impact, it can only really be subjective I think” 
[17]. 
Defects that constitute a constraint to OC are articulated to 
command by means of an OpDef signal. Each OpDef is 
assigned a category (Table 3) combining “Effect Category” 
(A ~ Major capability inoperative, B ~ Major capability 
significantly degraded, C ~ All other OpDef’s) and “Repair 
Indicator” (1 ~ Immediate rectification, 2 ~ Rectification 
required as soon as possible, 3 ~ Rectification not required 
until next programmed base port period, 4 ~ Rectification may 
await next programmed Upkeep period)  
 Table 3. Examples of OpDef Categories & Associated Impact upon OC 
The OpDef category indicates the urgency and subsequent 
prioritisation of support. The category and ensuing 
management of the risk may be redefined by Navy command. 
The immediate consequence is a differential experienced by 
onboard engineers between the anticipated and actual level of 
support and a potential delay in repair provision. 
The risk of complacency is an issue; technicians become 
familiar with regularly performed tasks that may lead to 
familiarisation with the dangers, which in turn leads to 
complacency [30]. 
“They de-risk evolutions in their minds, they don’t 
understand how much peril they’re in, you’re in a metal 
tube under the water, people forget that” [27] 
A comparatively low number of assets compels 
maintenance organisations to carefully manage the upkeep 
work package, endeavouring to complete Upkeep as agreed 
and available for operational tasking. 
“The problem we’ve got here is that the ship’s programmes 
now are so ‘bar taut’ that there is no scope for anything to 
go wrong” [31] 
Maintenance organisations are reviewing their procedures 
to de-risk and minimise the volume of growth as a result of 
emergent work / variation orders within an Upkeep project. 
Regrettably, the onboard maintenance data may not indicate 
the ‘material state of systems’, resulting in emergent work and 
increasing the risk to a timely completion of the project. 
“chilled water plants and one of them came in full of mud. 
Nothing in UMMS [Unit Maintenance Management 
System] … there’s no way it was working, yet UMMS 
never told us anything. … Fuel, was ‘perfectly fine’ when 
she came in, yet when I did a fuel flush, I got black treacle 
out of it and I took 120 metres of pipe work out of the ship, 
dipped it through the factory, cleaned it, put it back in 
again 3 week delay to diesels. I’m not joking, treacle, it 
was treacle and that’s after 3 days of flushing.” [32] 
In order to de-risk the maintenance activity it may 
necessitate a change in the business process, for example, 
subcontracting the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) 
to survey the vessel whilst deployed to determine the material 
state of the system and undertake the maintenance, 
“we went OEM, cost us a few quid sending them out to … 
but actually, it’s de-risk downstream big time … the 
growth bill would come down” [32] 
OpDef Category 
(Effect Category || 
Repair Indicator) 
Impact upon OC 
A1 1 of 2 Davits OOA [Out Of Action] unable to 
carry out boarding Ops. Unable to carry out 
concurrent flying and boat Ops 
C4 No redundancy for operating ships pre-wet system 
 Pre-Wet: System that sprays water over the hull and superstructure to 
increase survivability from radiological, chemical or biological attack. 
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A number of pre-Upkeep surveys are undertaken, including 
a Pre-Upkeep Material Assessment (PUMA), which is 
normally undertaken 12 months prior to Upkeep. However, 
during this period a vessel will invariably perform a 
deployment with consequential wear upon systems. Unlike 
commercial shipping who will typically operate to fixed 
itineraries, e.g. Maersk (ME1) departs on Saturday from 
Felixstowe and arrives in Jebel Ali exactly 28 days later [33], 
maintaining scheduled loading / unloading dates at an 
optimum transit speed. Naval vessels operate over a range of 
speeds (Fig. 1) and perform a variety of tasks. 
 
Fig.1 Ship’s log (S322) data from 5 RN vessels 2009-2010 
The PUMA may not reflect the actual state of the vessel 
prior to Upkeep. The risk of project growth and potential 
delay in vessel availability as a result of emergent work and 
variation orders is extremely high. The work package growth 
for a “Fleet Time Support Period” may be more than 50% 
compared with the standard estimate. 
An organisation will endeavour to minimise risk in the 
future by Learning From Experience (LFE); by the capture 
and utilisation of information, experience and tacit 
knowledge. 
“LFE, that’s one area where we’re trying to incorporate 
more and more LFE, because we do repeat projects here, 
… but that’s quite difficult to capture, evaluate and 
implement” [34]  
“Are we using LFE from previous, yes we do a bit,…” [35] 
An additional risk to maintenance is the complexity of the 
artefact: “the reliability of a system decreases when the 
number of components increases [36], i.e. the complexity 
increases” [37]. Naval vessels contain a substantial number of 
unique and complex systems with associated issues regarding 
support, spares, system knowledge, testing, integration. 
Naval vessels conform to national and international marine 
and environmental legislation, e.g. MARPOL (Marine 
Pollution). In addition to performing maintenance to promote 
environmental sustainability [38] failure to comply with 
protocols and legislation would inhibit littoral operations and 
constrain RN vessels to operate only in international waters. 
“All reasonable and practical maintenance measures are 
taken to minimise the impact of military activity has on the 
environment” [38] 
It should be noted that within a naval domain, minimising 
discharges also reduces the potential of detection. 
As indicated, the range and scope of risks that impact upon 
systems and vessels in a naval domain are extensive and 
reflect the dynamic operational / functional environment. 
4.2. Materiel  
Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S) has a £14 billion 
annual budget to buy and support all the equipment and 
services [39]. Inventory forms part of the budget; the value of 
the MoD inventory is substantial; at the end of December 
2011 the value was £40.3 billion (the gross value without 
adjustment for depreciation). Inventory spending in 2010-11 
was £2.9 billion and was forecast to spend between £1.5 
billion and £2 billion each year for the next five years [40]. 
Preventive and corrective maintenance of a system is 
affected by the availability of spare parts, adequate facilities, 
trained personnel, special tools and equipment” [41]. As part 
of the overall systems lifecycle, logistics and its related 
support infrastructure must be considered a major element of 
a “system” and not as a separate and independent entity to the 
maintenance activity [42]. This would be consistent with 
Blockley who stated, “systems thinking is about joined up 
thinking” [43]. Certainly by means of providing the right 
spares at the right place at the right time, it is possible to 
reduce the risk of unavailability [44]. However, this is often 
counter to the experience of RN maintainers, 
“Most problematic, it does vary from day to day, normally 
we find out what’s wrong relatively quickly, I would have 
to say probably availability of spares. Because a lot of the 
time we know what’s wrong, we know to fix it, but it’s not 
held onboard, it’s not on the shelf and there’s a long pause 
to get it.” [45] 
A number of domain specific constraints exist, including 
operational, geographical, unique equipment / systems, 
“The ship lost a significant period of time on task while 
waiting for additional main engine stores to be delivered 
into theatre” [46] 
During Upkeep the (non) availability of spares is also a 
persistent issue, 
“re-building port main engine, 24,000 hourly overhaul, 
had part problems from day 1, not the right parts, man 
coming to help us, found more parts needed…” [32] 
“OpDef raised as unable to complete 6M [month] SE 
[Safety/Environment] maintenance owing to unavailability 
of stores” [47] 
In addition to the non-availability of spares, their 
obsolescence is an issue. British Standard 62402 defines 
obsolescence as either, (a) transition from availability from 
the original manufacturer to unavailability, (b) permanent 
transition from operability to non-functionality due to external 
reasons [48] and may relate to repairable items, non-
repairable items, information, skills. Given the longevity of 
complex naval assets this may be experienced by all classes of 
vessels. 
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“non patt[ernised] cable still not received due to item 
obsolescence. GTG [Gas Turbine Group] still 
investigating alternative supply whilst SS [Ship Staff] use 
old cable.” [49]. 
DE&S are endeavouring to manage the obsolescence issue, 
“I want the contractor to look at obsolescence, not every 
week but every quarter, give me an obsolescence ‘heads 
up’ to say that certain items are now obsolete or 
potentially go obsolete in 12 months and what do I want to 
do about them” [50] 
Within the rail industry the change from mechanical to 
electronic / digital signalling systems highlights an issue with 
respect to obsolescence, 
“as we kind of modernise and computerise things, the 
turnaround time between a system being installed and then 
becoming obsolete is becoming quicker … whereas 
mechanical systems, some of which are now 110, 120 years 
old, there is sort of an expected life of a newer signalling 
system, say computer interlocking of 22 years,” [21] 
Similarly, the rate of change in computing raises 
obsolescence issues with airlines,  
“I have a whole pile of aircraft out there that have Pentium 
3 chips in them, I have a whole pile of modification over 
there that require Pentium ... It’s going to cost me 
£1million an aeroplane to change these chips to do this 
mod. So yeah, obsolescence is horrendous …” [20]  
Where spares / material is a particular issue, OpDef signals 
may be assigned a status of NAAIHTO [Not Available 
Anywhere In Hand To Obtain]; the non-availability of spares 
can vary with class, e.g. Class-P 3.3%, Class-R 10.1% 
(Sep/2014 ~ Jan/2015).  
Obsolescence may arise for a range of influences including 
national & international regulatory forces, e.g., environment 
legislation, continuous developments of new components 
[51]. In the worst case, spare parts may be unavailable owing 
to obsolescence resulting in entire systems needing to be 
replaced [52]. Within the naval domain, advances in 
technology particularly with respect to weapons and sensors 
will often result in upgrades, known as “Alteration’s and 
Addition’s” (A&A). However, the content and maturity of the 
A’s & A’s was raised,  
“I should have a spec. delivered A&A, delivered guidance 
here and I don’t. I get half, 60% if I’m lucky, … on one job, 
our biggest job and we haven’t even got the definition” 
[32] 
The lack of a detailed specification will have a 
consequential impact upon the project and subsequent 
maintenance. 
The opportunity to reduce project timescales by holding 
stock items was raised on numerous occasions, 
“I think in the current climate you don’t order them until 
you know which ones you need and so forth, but actually 
you could have a stock on the shelf and that would assist 
your surge capacity” [53] 
A consequence of such a large volume of emergent work is 
the inability to utilise techniques such as Kanban, whereby 
minimum inventory is held but necessitating detailed material 
planning, often the antithesis of naval maintenance. 
The Platform Specific Consolidated Allowance List (CAL) 
is an onboard material allowance formulated for the reduction 
in the number of days lost due to OpDef’s and to produce 
optimum support whilst balancing cost. Composition and 
availability of the CAL and actual subsequent usage is often a 
source of contention, 
“I’m never very satisfied with the amount of stores we can 
carry onboard, rarely we have a defect at sea we identify 
the stores and we happen to hold it in my opinion” [17] 
“the DLO [Deputy Logistic Officer] said to me, 20% of 
OpDef items that required stores support were rectified by 
items on the CAL” [2] 
Problems with the CAL have also been highlighted within 
OpDef’s,  
“Historically held onboard, CAL change in 2009 dropped 
allowance from 3 to 0” [54] 
“Not on CAL. Yes should carry” [55]  
A lack of equipment / stores availability may result in a 
STOROB [Stores Robbery], i.e. the removal of a ship's fitted 
equipment (or parts of it) for installation in another. The 
Secretary of State for Defence declared this should be, “used 
only as a last resort to meet high readiness operational 
commitments” [56]: however, STOROB is frequently used to 
resolve non-availability of spares. 
“Early in build, one of our gas turbines was removed for 
[HMS] Daring after hers was damaged. The list of major 
items was sufficient to fill the back of a T-shirt with the 
jaunty line ‘The Last, the Best, more sea-time than the 
Rest’; claiming tongue in cheek that most of our kit was 
already at sea in the other ships of the Class” [57] 
Far from an option of “last resort”, STOROB is a standard 
OpDef status, e.g. 
“Fwd Diesel Generator Out Of Action … STOROB action. 
100% loss of blackout recovery.” [58] 
4.3. Suitably Qualified & Experienced Personnel 
The number of engineers (Air, Marine & Weapons) within 
the RN is 10,140 [59] and represents almost 44% of the total 
RN full time strength. The number may appear significant 
given the number of vessels, however, the total number masks 
shortages in particular roles and specialism’s. 
“a shortfall of 195 marine engineers – some 35 per cent of 
the fleet – and 175 weapons engineers, or 45 per cent. 
There is a shortfall of 60 nuclear watch keepers, equivalent 
to 15 per cent of the full-strength.” [60] 
The availability of Suitably Qualified & Experience 
Personnel (SQEP) was highlighted as an issue in each 
functional phase. During Regeneration and Tasking the non-
availability of RN maintainers is a critical factor in the 
maintenance of systems and the sustained provision of OC. 
Where a post is vacant, the RN / MoD use the term “gapped”,  
“in the absence of the gapped M1G section head, the M1 
Group Head and M1C Section Head whilst having a basic 
knowledge of the systems were unable to diagnose beyond 
the basic.” [61] 
Gapping within the submarine service is less of an issue, as 
requisite staffing is a requirement for safe operation,  
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“certainly on the ME side they said we’re not allowed to be 
“gapped” which you can do on surface ships.” [27] 
The absence of maintainers impacts the level of knowledge 
and experience as well as increasing the workload for 
remaining staff. “Gapping” increases dependence upon 
OEM’s and maintenance organisations and potential delays as 
a result of unscheduled requests for assistance. 
“due to slow provision of OEM advice SS were delayed in 
defect diagnosis … The proposed repair plan is to request 
assistance from OEM to support SS limited ability to 
diagnose faults fully. SS knowledge exhausted.” [61] 
Increasingly OEM’s and maintenance organisations are 
required to assist vessels whilst deployed, 
“OEM assistance required to diagnose defect. Program 
changes delayed OEM arrival to assist.” [54] 
The consequence of increased dependence upon OEM’s 
support is a lack of system knowledge and capability / 
confidence within RN / MoD staff. During Upkeep, the lack 
of SQEP was also perceived as an issue, 
“people aren’t SQEP’d enough and that’s no disrespect to 
anybody… we’re not breeding enough SQEP through-out” 
[32] 
Within the rail industry a similar problem exists, when 
discussing SQEP, “And enough of them, it’s no good needing 
ten, but we only have three.” [21] 
Maintenance cannot be undertaken without an adequate 
number or trained personnel [41]. A lack of SQEP will 
constrain corrective or preventive maintenance.. 
5. Conclusion and Next Steps 
This paper highlights a number of issues, i.e. 
 
a. RN vessels promote and realize Maritime Doctrine; 
accordingly a vessel can be re-tasked with immediate 
effect with a change in role, geographical location, 
threat, etc... with consequential impact upon system 
operation / usage / load.  
b. Given the scope and duration of operational roles, 
RN vessels maintain a high level of self-sufficiency 
and carefully manage each of the factors detailed 
above. Self-sufficiency is particularly relevant with 
respect to submarines that maintain the UK’s CASD 
and remain submerged for 3 months. 
c. The RN has recognised many of the issues identified 
and have initiated the development of a Naval 
Engineering Strategy [62, 63, 64] known as Project 
Faraday, to be led by the Chief Naval Engineer 
Officer. The objective being the delivery of 
engineering capability by proactively managing 
personnel, training, information, etc. within the 
engineering domain. Project Faraday will endeavour 
to resolve the issues detailed. Similarly, it should be 
noted DE&S are making significant investments in a 
new Inventory Management Operating Cluster to 
tackle inventory demand planning, supply and 
management. 
d. Naval platforms are a complex system of systems, 
which over time will suffer obsolescence; a managed 
life extension programme for Type 23 Frigates is 
currently in hand. [65, 66] 
e. The RN when compared with a power company, rail 
infrastructure and Europe’s largest regional airline 
would appear to exhibit a number of similarities, e.g. 
nuclear technology, artefact longevity, safety,… 
however, the differences would appear to outweigh 
any similarities, e.g. risk aversion, modus operandi. 
f. In recent years (2001~2015) the MoD has 
experienced real term budget cuts [67] with further 
possible reductions for 2016/17 [68]. The 
consequence has been a reduction in manpower and 
increasing pressure on maintenance budgets. 
g. The physical environment and operation is often 
outside the original design scope and hence the 
Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis is 
potentially not valid or applicable, necessitating the 
application of “engineering judgement” and the 
associated risk to personnel and system. 
h. As detailed above, there exists a considerable 
number of disruptive forces that effect the OC of RN 
vessels, e.g. risk, SQEP, materiel, however, the 
durability and sensitivity of the RN, DE&S and the 
Surface Ship Support Alliance support capability is 
such to respond to each “force” in the most 
appropriate manner. 
Current research in improved knowledge and decision 
making is investigating lexical analysis of OpDef’s. The data 
contains information that is considered high value [69]; 
furthermore, it provides information to various stakeholders 
with varying requirements, i.e. 
a. ODH / CODH: limitations upon operational 
capability. 
b. PDH: (i) “immediate” rectification and restoration of 
capability (ii) maintenance / upgrades undertaken 
during Upkeep for the purpose of increasing system / 
equipment availability. 
Lexical analysis research of OpDef’s is intended to 
investigate two questions, (i) determine the normality of a 
defect with respect to existing defects, (ii) undertake 
sentiment analysis of OpDef signals. 
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